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Abstract 
The security vulnerabilities in current GSM networks allow eavesdroppers to 
monitor entire communication between the mobile device and the base station over 
the air. In this thesis, a security framework for mobile communication is proposed. 
Within this framework, we develop a secure key exchange protocol using Elliptic 
Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH). We further employ double hash chains for session 
key generation in order not to repeat resource-hungry ECDH operations too often and 
in order to provide forward and backward secrecy. We adopt this key exchange and 
generation protocol to short message service (SMS) and voice communication in 
mobile environment. As a proof of concept, we also implement our framework on 
Android platform. Moreover, we analyzed the performance of our framework using 
different mobile equipments. For the voice communication protocol, we also measure 
the data network performance for various places in the city. 
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MOBİL İLETİŞİM İÇİN GÜVENLİK ALTYAPISI 
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Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenli Anahtar Değişimi, GSM Güvenliği, Mobil Güvenlik 
Altyapısı, Mobil İletişim Güvenliği 
Özet 
GSM ağlarındaki güvenlik açıkları, kötü niyetli kişilerin cep telefonları ile baz 
istasyonları arasında yapılan bütün iletişimi izlemesine sebep olmaktadır. Bu tezde 
mevcut güvenlik sorunlarının önüne geçmeyi hedefleyen bir güvenlik altyapısı 
önerilmektedir. Bu altyapının bir parçası olarak Eliptik Eğriler Diffie Hellman 
(ECDH) metoduyla bir güvenli anahtar değişimi protokolü geliştirilmiştir. Ayrıca çift 
özet zincirleri yardımıyla bir oturum boyunca kullanılan simetrik anahtarlar 
oluşturulur. Bunun sebebi aşırı güç tüketen ECDH operasyonlarının sıklıkla 
tekrarlanmaması ve oturum sırasında kullanılan anahtarlardan birinin ele geçirilmesi 
durumunda, önceki ve sonraki anahtarların ele geçirilen anahtar yardımıyla 
üretilememesidir. Söz konusu protokol ses iletişiminde ve kısa mesaj iletişiminde 
kullanılmak üzere geliştirilmiştir. Bir uygulama örneği olarak geliştirilen protokol 
Android işletim sistemi üzerinde gerçeklenmiştir. Tezde aynı zaman uygulamanın 
değişik donanım gücündeki mobil cihazlarla performans ölçümleri de yer almaktadır. 
Ses iletişimi için ek olarak mobil şebekenin veri bağlantı hızı şehrin değişik 
yerlerinde ölçülmüştür. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile communication industry is probably the most emerging industry in the 
last two decades. With billions of consumers around the world and hundreds of 
mobile operators [18], mobile phones have become an important part of our lives. 
Beside voice communication, mobile phones serve as newsreaders, reminders, and 
alarm clocks and even as gaming devices. With so many connection possibilities and 
application areas, mobile phones have become a must for every person in the 21
st
 
century. 
The first generation mobile communication network has started in 1981 in 
Nordic Countries including Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden [44]. The Nordic 
Mobile Telephone (NMT) system is known to be the first cellular phone network. 
This cellular system allows users to communicate wirelessly with each other like on a 
regular hard line, but, of course, the user has to be in the reach of a base station. A 
base station receives and sends signals from users in its coverage area and connects 
them to the mobile operator. Then the mobile operator makes the connection between 
the caller and the callee [31]. This basic explanation of the mobile infrastructure is 
still in use in the latest generation of mobile networks. 
Radiolinja in Finland introduced the second-generation mobile network in 1991. 
The infrastructure was build and provided by Ericsson [44]. The system was designed 
and developed by a joint work of 13 European countries. The first name was Groupe 
Special Mobile (GSM) [31], which was changed later to Global System of Mobile 
Communication (also GSM). In 1993, the system was being used in 48 countries [44]. 
Today, more than %80 of the world’s mobile communication is done with GSM 
infrastructure. 
The second-generation system includes some subservices besides voice 
communication. The first service to be introduced was Short Message Service (SMS), 
which allows users to communicate with each other by sending text messages [15]. 
The number of characters that can be sent for this service is 160 for ASCII letters and 
140 for UTF-8 character set because of the bit limitation.  Another service, which has 
also generated the need for a 3
rd
 generation network, was data communication. Global 
Packet Radio Service (GPRS) was the first data transfer method in GSM, which can 
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be performed simultaneously with a voice call. That is, one does not need to drop a 
voice call when transferring data [44]. After GPRS, the EDGE (Enhanced Data Rates 
for GSM) has been announced. EDGE allows users to reach faster data transfer rates 
(up to 400 Kbits/s) compared to GPRS (40 Kbits/s). These technologies often referred 
as 2.5G or 2.75G depending on the bandwidth they provide.  
To provide faster connection speed, third generation network infrastructure has 
been announced in 2001. Japan was the first country to use the new UMTS (Universal 
Mobile Telecommunications System). Other countries in Europe, where the second 
generation GSM dominated the market also adopted their network to UMTS [31]. To 
be able to use this new network technology, a consumer needs to buy 3G compatible 
handsets. Those new cell phones also provide backward compatibility for second 
generation GSM system. In this case, 2G network is used mostly for voice 
communication and also for data communication, where 3G network is not available. 
3G networks are able to provide up to 56 MBit/s download speed [31].  
Like every communication method in the history of mankind, eavesdroppers 
also threaten mobile phone networks. For the second-generation networks, a stream-
cipher, called A5, was announced [32], where the communication between the base 
station and mobile handset is encrypted with a key size between 16 to 64 bits 
depending on the operator. Before the encryption phase, a session key exchange is 
done using A3 algorithm [32]. The information for the key exchange and user 
identification is stored in the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) cards provided by the 
operator upon subscription. Although the second-generation infrastructure is known 
to be secure for many years, researchers have found vulnerabilities in the security 
mechanism, both in algorithm and authentication protocol [32]. After the first 
published attack on A5 in year 2000 [32], the GSM 2G network cannot be considered 
as secure anymore.  
Subservices, for example short message service, also suffer from this security 
vulnerability. Furthermore text messages are stored unencrypted in the short message 
service center (SMSC) [1] until they are sent, which makes them vulnerable to 
eavesdroppers working inside the mobile operator. It is known that many companies 
reach their customers via short message service, where they sent private or personal 
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information. Especially in government applications, the text messages should be 
encrypted to provide extra security due to network vulnerabilities [35, 36].  
In this thesis, we designed a key exchange and secure communication protocol 
for available communication methods, for both text and voice. Due to the limited 
computational capabilities of mobile devices and network limitations, algorithms in 
the protocol were chosen to be computed fast and to provide higher security at lower 
key sizes.  
For text messaging, the network limitation for the size of one message is 1120 
bits [1]. Therefore, a key exchange model based on RSA fails to provide enough 
security in one message due to larger key sizes. Another consideration for the system 
is to initiate the protocol with minimum number of messages, since every message is 
charged at the operator. Therefore sending multiple messages for larger key sizes was 
out of the scope. The final decision for key exchange is to use ECDH (Elliptic Curve 
Diffie-Hellman), since it provides higher security at smaller key sizes [19]. 
Furthermore the performance for ECDH makes it suitable for mobile devices. 
For voice communication, we modified our protocol used in text message 
encryption. We developed a VoIP-like communication model, where two mobile 
clients are connected with each other over the data network (3G where available). 
This is convenient for the user, since the system does not depend on a third party 
server to store matching IP addresses with phone numbers. To establish the 
connection, the IP addresses of both parties are exchanged during the key exchange. 
The key exchange is achieved by sending text messages to each other.   
In this thesis, we have implemented two key exchange protocols, one for voice 
communication and another one for text messaging. One application is written for 
J2ME supported mobile phones, where there is less computational power and limited 
memory. This implementation only covers the secure text message protocol and aims 
the highest percentage of mobile devices on the market [44].  The second application 
is written for Android platform, an open source operating system supported and 
developed by Google and Open Handset Alliance [45]. Android supports Java 
language in the application level [45] and offers a wide range of libraries to reach the 
hardware functionality of the phone. Android mainly focuses on mobile smart phones 
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where the computational power is considerably high as compared to non-smart 
phones [45]. Therefore, we have chosen to implement the voice encryption in the 
Android platform. 
The performance tests were done in many aspects. The first test aims to show 
the hardware performance for encryption and key exchange operations. Here, we try 
to find the optimum security and performance metrics for different key sizes and CPU 
power. The second test is done for voice communication, where the performance of 
the network is measured. The delay between sender and receiver is recorded 
according to the end to end delay of the data packets in different networks. The 
network type can be either 3G data network or 2G with EDGE capabilities. Different 
bandwidth sizes result in different delays. Also the regions, where the tests are 
performed, are recorded to provide extra information on network status. The region is 
important due to the number of base stations and number of people living in this area, 
since they both have an impact on network quality. 
In the next section, we provide information about GSM networks and 
cryptography. The third section explains our protocol and also includes the security 
analysis. The fourth section includes the performance test results and the fifth section 
summarizes the thesis. 
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2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
In this section, we give background information for the terms, systems and 
algorithms used in this thesis. In Section 2.1, information about the mobile 
communication networks will be given. In Section 2.2, symmetric encryption 
algorithms, key exchange methods and hash functions are explained. In Section 2.3, 
literature on mobile communication security will be summarized. 
 2.1. Background on Global System for Mobile Communication 
Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) is most widely used mobile 
communication system around the world. In this section, we give background 
information on voice and short message infrastructure of the GSM network. 
 2.1.1. Voice Infrastructure 
The cellular infrastructure was developed to increase the capacity of the mobile 
telephone service [31]. Before the introduction of the cellular infrastructure, the 
capacity of a wireless telephone system was limited to 25 channels within 80 km 
radius. The idea behind the cellular network is to use many transmitters with shorter 
radius and lower power.  
The highest power transmitted by a cellular station is about 100 W. Since the 
radius is small as compared to the older systems, a region can be divided into smaller 
areas with his own transmitter. Each area in a region has a frequency range and 
transmitter called base station [31]. Neighboring cells cannot have the same frequency 
because of the interference, but a frequency can be reused, if the base stations are far 
away from each other. 
The most ideal form to split a region is to build hexagonal shaped areas within 
the region. With a radius of  , each station is       away from each other. Having the 
same distance between all base stations allows users to switch to the other station 
much easier [31]. In practice however, this hexagonal shape cannot be achieved 
perfectly because of the geographical shape of the region. 
The frequency reuse in the cellular infrastructure allows mobile operators to 
serve more clients with less frequency bands. This is achieved by repeating a 
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frequency band with cell stations far away from each other. The main challenge in a 
base station design is to use the same frequency as much as possible. Since it is not 
possible to have two neighbor cells with the same frequency band, a design should be 
made carefully.  
With the increasing number of customers, the system needs to be expanded by 
adding more frequency bands into the network. To increase the capacity, the 
following methods are available; 
1. Adding new channels: If there are still unused frequencies available in 
the region, the base stations can be updated to use these available frequencies 
2. Frequency borrowing: Frequencies of neighboring cells can be set 
dynamically. 
3. Cell splitting: Since the perfect hexagonal pattern is never achieved 
due to regulations or geographic conditions, it is mostly possible to add new base 
stations into the network. Splitting the region into smaller areas and redesigning the 
network and frequency usages allows the network to serve more customers. The 
downfall is that the more base stations you have in a region, the more handoffs will 
the user have. 
4. Cell sectoring: Cell sectoring means dividing the cell coverage into 
smaller sectors with different channels. Cell sectoring is only possible with the help of 
directional antennas. In this case, one cell can be divided into 3 or 6 areas with 
different frequency bands. 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) was a standard developed 
by European countries to have the same network rules in every country so that users 
can use their cell phones all around the continent. After the success of GSM system, it 
became a global standard, which includes countries in America, Asia, Africa and 
Middle East. In 2010, there were over 4,42 billion GSM subscriptions worldwide [9].  
The main components in a GSM system as defined in the standard are as 
follows [31]; 
1. Mobile Station: Mobile station is an electronic device, which 
communicates with the base station. In order to be a mobile station, a device should 
have a SIM card, radio transceiver and digital signal processor. The Subscriber 
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Identity Module (SIM) contains all the necessary information for authentication and 
secure communication with the mobile operator. The mobile operator uses this 
information to identify his customer. The SIM is vital for a user to make phone calls 
or data connection over the network. 
2. Base Station Subsystem: Also known as BSS, a base station subsystem 
includes a base station controller (BSC) with a set of transceiver stations attached to 
it. The Base Transceiver Station (BTS) is a single cell with a radio antenna, radio 
transceiver and a connection to his Base Station Controller. BSC is responsible for 
handoffs between its cells and allocating radio frequencies. 
3. Network Subsystem: Network Subsystem (NS) controls the 
communication between the GSM network and public telecommunication network. 
The main functionalities of MS are authenticating and validating customers, 
controlling handoffs and enabling roaming for visiting customers. The NS is 
controlled by mobile switching center (MSC). The information is stored in four 
databases; 
a) Home Location Register (HLR): HLR stores the information of every 
customer and the base stations that the customers are connected to. 
b) Visitor Location Register (VLR): The location information of every 
customer is stored in the Visitor Location Register. This location information is the 
current physical location of each customer in the network. This information is used to 
determine to find the switching center when a call comes to the customer. 
c) Authentication Center (AuC): In the Authentication Center Database 
all the private information about the customers is stored. This information consists of 
private keys for encryption and authentication. 
d) Equipment Identity Register (EIR): In this database, all the information 
about devices in the network is stored. 
The overall GSM infrastructure is given in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 – GSM Architecture [29] 
In GSM networks authentication of subscribers to the mobile operator is 
important for network security. Before a user identifies him to the network, an 
authentication followed by a key exchange occurs. After that, the communication 
between the mobile station and base station is performed in encrypted manner. 
Since the computational power in 1980s was not feasible for public key 
cryptography, a different method for authentication was chosen in GSM standard. A3 
algorithm is used for user authentication. The A5 is used for encryption of data over 
the air and A8 algorithm is used as the key generation algorithm. The algorithms were 
kept safe between the contributors of the GSM Memorandum of Understanding, but 
many attacks on those algorithms were published since the announcement of GSM 
[32]. 
A3 and A8 should be same only between the subscriber and mobile operator; 
therefore, they can be different in every operator. The standard only defines the input 
and output of those algorithms [32]. COMP128 algorithm, which was a popular 
choice for A3 and A8, allowed attackers to clone SIM cards and to make duplicate 
subscribers within the operator [32]. This is done by subtracting the key from the SIM 
card and copying it to another. Recent algorithms are much more secure than 
COMP128, which make SIM cards to be more resistant. 
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A5 is a standard encryption algorithm between the communication of mobile 
devices and base stations. A5/2 is a weak version of A5 with 16 bits of key length. 
The non-export version A5 however has a key length of 56 bits. Both algorithms have 
been broken and attacks were published [32]. 
Every time a subscriber wants to join the network, the authentication process 
occurs. The authentication process is shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2 – GSM Authentication [34] 
The mobile stations send a subscriber identity, either TMSI or IMSI. The VLR 
send TMSI to IMSI and than the IMSI is sent to HLR/AuC. The AuC creates a 
random 128-bit challenge called      and calculates                   and 
also the encryption key                 . The values               are 
sent back to VLR, where      and    are hold and      is sent to mobile station 
[32]. 
The mobile station calculates                    with the information 
stored in the SIM and sends it to VLR. If      and     match, the client is 
authenticated. In a visited network AuC sends a set of               values to 
the VLR to make the authentication process faster. 
Although all traffic over the air is encrypted, the infrastructure can choose to 
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disable the encryption. It is also possible that a handshake is made between mobile 
station and network on which algorithms they support [32]. After that, they both 
decide on which encryption algorithm they will use. 
 
Figure 2.3 – A5 Algorithm [44] 
A5 is a stream cipher with 114-bit frames given in Figure 2.3. Each frame has a 
key generated from    and current 22-bit frame number. Since the transmission can 
contain errors due to various reasons between network and mobile station, a stream 
cipher is preferred. A block cipher would cause an avalanche effect in the output, if a 
bit is damaged during the transmission [32]. Despite the block cipher, in a stream 
cipher only one bit is affected in the same situation.  
 2.1.2. Short Message Service 
A short message can be either     characters long with ASCII encoding [14, 
15] or 140 characters with UTF-8. Eastern countries like China or Japan, where more 
characters are required, have Unicode encoding with    characters [16, 17]. 
Assuming that a character can be   bits long in GSM 38.03, a message body can carry 
               bits of data. For longer messages, the devices divide the message 
and a sequence number is given to each part by the phone.  
Short messages can also be used to activate operator specific SIM commands. 
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Such messages can be used to disable a SIM or a mobile device, upload network 
settings, etc. Their corresponding bits in the message header identify these messages 
and mostly the user does not get a notification about them.  
Another type of short message is the cell broadcast service, which is sent only 
to those mobile devices that listen to a specific broadcast channel [16]. This type of 
message is mostly used to give information to people in a specific area about traffic or 
weather. Also news headlines or commercial ads can be broadcasted according to 
subscription [18]. 
 
Figure 2.4 – SMS Life Cycle [27] 
Unlike phone calls, the short messages should arrive at the destination even 
when the receiver’s phone is off. In order to achieve that the messages should be 
stored at some point during transport for the case that receiver is either out of range or 
have his phone turned off. The server to achieve this store and forward system is 
called SMSC (Short Message Server Center) [13, 16]. The overall life cycle of a short 
message is given in Figure 2.4.  
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Figure 2.5 – Mobile Originated SMS [25] 
When user sends a message, first it goes to the BS over the air. After that the 
message is delivered to the SMSC using the SS7 (Signaling System 7) network [11]. 
A short message, which is created by the mobile phone and sent to the SMSC, is 
called MO (Mobile Originated). A Mobile Originated message lifecycle is shown in 
Figure 2.5. When the message arrives at SMSC, the destination is questioned at the 
HLR (Home Location Register). If it is active, the message is forwarded to his 
receiver, again using SS7 network and air interface. Such a message is called MT 
(mobile terminated), meaning it is sent from SMSC to the mobile device [16]. Mobile 
Terminated message lifecycle is shown in Figure 2.6. 
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Figure 2.6 – Mobile Terminated SMS [25] 
Since the SMSC is responsible to handle huge amounts of messages inside the 
operator, it is possible that some messages might get lost. When a message is not sent 
within the expiration time, it is discarded by the SMSC. This is mostly the case, when 
the receiver side stays inactive for a long time.  
 2.1.3. Vulnerabilities of Short Message Service 
Like the voice communication in GSM network, SMS protocol also suffers 
from some security threats. In this section, we will mention some of them. 
 2.1.3.1. Over the Air 
The transfer between the mobile device and the base station is established 
through the air. According to GSM standard [1], this communication can be either 
unencrypted, if the law does not permit it, or encrypted using A5 algorithm. A5 comes 
with two additional options; A5/1 with strong encryption using 64-bit key and A5/2 
with a 16-bit key [1]. Such key lengths are no more considered as secure according to 
NIST [21]. Furthermore, recent researches show weaknesses in the A5 algorithm. An 
eavesdropper with enough equipment can crack all encrypted information within 
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hours [20]. Also, if the communication is unencrypted, an ordinary attacker with an 
antenna capable of receiving GSM signals can listen to the communication. 
The false BSS attack targets the one-way authentication weakness of the GSM 
network [22]. By using his own BSS equipment, an attacker can make the mobile 
station believe that it is communicating over operator’s channel. Since choice of 
encryption is under BSS’s control, attacker can manipulate the mobile station not to 
use encryption. In this way the attacker can easily watch all the communication. 
 2.1.3.2. Inside the Operator 
Although the SMSC is protected through firewalls and other countermeasures, it 
is still possible for someone to gain access to the contents. Since the messages are 
kept unencrypted in the database, an attacker can read or manipulate every message. 
Also someone inside the operator with enough privileges can get the information in a 
message. 
The communication between the SMSC and the base station is performed using 
SS7. This layer of communication is completely under the control of the operator and 
it is possible that someone with knowledge about SS7 can eavesdrop or even change 
the contents of every message going through network. Security in SS7 is not 
mandatory and the operators mostly keep the security measure in this layer secret. 
Another fact about SMSC is that we cannot know how long our messages are 
kept in the database of the operator. If the operator decides to store every message in 
its server, our confidential information will stay at that database forever, which may 
be later accessed by other people. The information can be used for commercial issues 
or for gaining personal information about a specific person. 
 2.1.3.3. Modification 
The header of a message defines whether it is a normal text message or an 
operator setting. It also contains information of the sender. Since the header is not 
protected and does not contain a checksum, the receiver cannot understand whether a 
modification is made to it. Therefore an attacker can impersonate someone by 
changing the sender information field in the header. 
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The body part of the message is also subject to the modification attacks like the 
header. In this way, an attacker can change vital information in a message and cause 
problems for the sender or receiver. 
 2.2. Background on Cryptography 
In this section, background information on encryption algorithms and methods 
are provided.  
 2.2.1. Diffie Hellman Key Exchange 
Diffie Hellman Key Exchange [24] is the first key exchange algorithm which 
uses public-key cryptography. It is widely used by commercial and non-commercial 
applications.  
The purpose of the algorithm is to provide a secure method for two users (Alice 
and Bob) to share a secret with each other. It is crucial for applications, which use 
symmetric encryption algorithms to provide secure communication channels. 
The algorithm runs as follows; 
1. One of the parties (Alice or Bob) select a large prime number  , a 
generator  , and an integer  , where      . The generator   is a primitive root of  . 
Those values can be shared over an insecure channel. 
2. Alice calculates            and sends           to Bob. 
3. Alice calculates            and sends   to Alice. 
4. After these values are exchanged, the shared secret K can be generated. 
The calculation is as follows; 
                          (2.1) 
The key exchange steps and calculations are given in Figure 2.7. 
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Figure 2.7 – Diffie Hellman Key Exchange [37] 
An attacker, who wants to obtain  , should know  . After that, he or she can 
calculate  . The main problem for an attacker is to calculate the discrete log. This 
calculation is known to be computationally hard. 
 2.2.2. Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 
Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman is a key exchange algorithm [24, 30, 42]. 
Suppose Alice and Bob wants to exchange a key. They agree on a point on the elliptic 
curve                             and a base point   on  . The algorithm 
runs as follows; 
1. Alice selects an integer     , where   is the order of  .    is the private 
key of Alice. The public key is generated as; 
                  (2.2) 
2. Bob also generates a private key    and a public key    as; 
                  (2.3) 
3. Alice generates the shared secret           . Bob also generates the 
shared secret as          . The shared secret   is the same at both sides 
because; 
                              (2.4) 
 If an attacker wants to obtain the shared secret, he should be able to solve the 
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm problem, which is known to be computationally 
hard [42]. 
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 2.2.3. Advanced Encryption Standard 
 Data Encryption Standard (DES), the successor of AES, is a symmetric 
encryption algorithm. The algorithm works as a block cipher with the size of 64 bits 
and uses 56 bit keys to encrypt the plain text [43].  DES was first published in 1977 
by IBM and widely used in government and commercial applications. 
After the end of life of DES, National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) started an election for the next standard in 1997 [43]. Rijndael cipher was 
selected from a group of five algorithms and became the successor of DES in 2001 
with the name Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). 
Like DES, AES is also a block cipher with a block size of 128 bits [43]. AES is 
actually a standardized version of Rijndael algorithm. AES supports 128 bits block 
size, whereas Rijndael supports various block and key sizes [43]. 
Although AES has a block size of 128 bits, its keys can be of size 128, 192 or 
256 bits. The algorithm works as repetitions of rounds, where each round consists of 
four steps. For the decryption, those rounds work in reverse to get the plain text back. 
The algorithm will not be described in detail, since it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
128 bits key size provides enough security until 2030 according to NIST [21]. 
Furthermore, there are no attacks reported on the algorithm. Therefore, AES is the 
choice of symmetric encryption algorithm in the protocol implementation. 
 2.2.4. Cryptographic Hash Functions 
A hash function is a function, which gives a fixed size output for an arbitrary 
length input. The output is called the message digest [42]. A cryptographic hash 
function should satisfy the following rules; 
1. The function should work fast. For a message  , the output      
should be produced rapidly. 
2. The function   should be one-way. This means that it is 
computationally hard to find the message  from the message digest     .  
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3. It should be computationally hard to find two arbitrary messages with 
the same message digest              . The property is called strong collision 
resistance. This property claims that finding collisions should be computationally 
infeasible [42].  
4. Another property for hash functions is the weak collision-resistance. 
That is for any  , it is hard to find       such that               It should be 
infeasible to find a message   that produces the same digest of a known message . 
There are many cryptographic hash functions in service today. Some of them 
are the Message Digest (MD) family and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) series of 
algorithms [42]. 
The algorithm of the first MD was never published, but the algorithms of MD2, 
MD4 and MD5 are known by public. After weaknesses were founded in the first MD 
algorithms, Ron Rivest published MD5, which was an upgraded version of MD4. Due 
to recent collisions found in MD5, its security is no more certain [42]. 
The secure hash algorithm was produced and used by National Security Agency 
(NSA) and given to National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [42]. In 
1993, the first version of SHA was published (FIPS 180). The SHA-1 is an 
improvement version of SHA, which is recommended by NIST. 
The length of the message digest produced by SHA-1 is 160 bits for any 
message. The input message m is sliced into smaller messages                 
with the same length. A compression function works repeatedly taking these blocks 
and the output of the previous block as an input. Let’s say    is the first value. Than 
                 will be the formula for the next output. The last output    is the 
message digest for . 
The most important part of a cryptographic hash function is the underlying 
compression function [42]. The input bits of this compression function should change 
as many output bits as possible. An important change in SHA-1 is that it uses more 
input bits to produce output bits during operation compared to MD algorithm. That 
makes the SHA-1 more reliable but also slower. 
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As of 2010, SHA-1 is no more considered to be secure due to recent attacks on 
the algorithm. In 2005, Rijmen and Oswald published an attack, where they make less 
then     operations to find a collision [48]. Also in the same year, Xiaoyun Wang, 
Yiqun Lisa Yin and Hongbo Yu published another attack with less than     
operations to find a collision [47]. Later, they improved their work, where they 
require only     operations [49]. 
The new SHA-2 family hash functions are named after their output length, 
SHA-256 with 256 bits output, SHA-384 with 384 bits output and SHA-512 with 512 
bits output. The new versions have the same structure and binary operation like SHA-
1 [24].  
Table 2.1 – SHA family hash functions 
 SHA 1 SHA 256 SHA 384 SHA 512 
Digest Size (in 
bits) 
160 256 384 512 
Message Size 
(in bits) 
                      
Resistance to 
birthday 
attacks (trials) 
                   
 
The hash functions are vulnerable to birthday attacks [41]. Birthday attack 
implies that it is possible to find a collision in      evaluations, where   is the length 
of output in bits.  To provide equivalent security with the AES-128, SHA-256 was 
chosen as the hash function in the protocol implementation. Comparisons of different 
hash functions can be found in Table 2.1.  
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 2.2.5. Using Hash Functions for Integrity Check 
  To ensure the integrity of the message, a hash function can be used as follows. 
Suppose we have two parties, A and B, which share a secret password    only 
known to them. When A sends B a message, he sends              with the message 
as in Figure 2.8; 
 
Figure 2.8 – Message integrity check 
In order to check the integrity of the message, B will concatenate the message 
with the pre-shared password   . If the hash of the message matches the received 
hash, B can be sure that the message is not tampered. An attacker C, who wants to 
modify the message, cannot extract the pre-shared password out of the hash due to the 
one-way property of the hash functions. 
 2.2.6. Hash Chains 
A hash chain is a series of hash functions, where the input of one hash function 
is the output of the previous hash function. The number of hash functions in the hash 
chain gives the length of the hash chain. A hash chain of length   can be shown as 
follows; 
                                 (2.5) 
 , where                         . 
 
For example, a hash chain of length 4 is; 
                                       (2.6) 
The hash chains are very easy to store, since you only need the first input value 
  to produce any element in the hash chain. In our text messaging protocol, this 
n times 
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property is used to generate different keys for every text message. After the key 
exchange, both parties know the input value for the hash chain, the seed  , where they 
generate the     element of the hash chain as the key for the     message [50]. 
Due to the one-way property, a hash chain provides backward secrecy, when the 
chain is employed for key generation. Backward secrecy means that compromising 
any key during an encrypted communication should not compromise earlier keys. 
Forward secrecy is that the attacker cannot produce any future keys from a 
compromised key. 
 To improve a hash chain to provide both forward and backward secrecy, double 
hash chain is used to generate symmetric keys in our protocol. A double hash chain is 
two series of hash chains, which are generated with two different seeds. In our 
protocol, we created two chains with the different seeds    and    derived from the 
shared secret after the key exchange. The symmetric key is generated from XORed 
output values of two hash chains. The generation method for symmetric keys will be 
given in the Section 3. 
 2.2.7. Applications of Hash Chains 
The Lamport authentication scheme [51] is an authentication scheme using hash 
chains. In this scheme the server stores the n
th 
hash chain value of the password pw. 
The user calculates and sends       hash value to server. The server calculates 
            . If the stored hash value matches the calculated hash value, the user is 
authenticated. This time the server stores       hash for future authentication.  
Suppose an attacker knows          . Since the server waits for           for 
the next authentication, the attacker cannot produce           from           due 
to the one-way property of hash functions. The user can authenticate with the server   
times. 
 2.2.8. Digital Signatures 
Digital signatures are used to provide undeniable authentication proof about the 
owner of a message. In order to prove that a message belongs to a particular person, a 
third party needs to verify the digital signature attached to the message.  
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A digital signature scheme consists of three parts; a key generation algorithm, a 
signature algorithm and a verification algorithm. The digital signature for a document 
can only be created by using a secret known by the owner of the document, for 
example a private key. In order to verify the signature, a public key should be 
distributed. The verification algorithm takes the document and the public key as the 
input and checks whether the document is signed by the owner or not.  
In most of the digital signature schemes, public key cryptography is used. It 
should be infeasible to calculate the private key from the public key to provide 
security for the digital signature. 
 2.2.9. Digital Signature Algorithm 
The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) was proposed as the Digital Signature 
Standard (DSS) in 1991 by NIST [53]. The public and private key generation phase is 
as follows; 
1. User selects a prime   such that                 
2. User chooses an integer t with           and a prime p with           
            , so that     can be divided by   
3. User selects   with              and computes                  . 
If      , a new   must be chosen. 
4. User selects   with             
5. Computes             
6.   is the private key and           is the public key 
To sign a message, the following steps are performed; 
1. User selects a random   with             
2. Computes                    
3. Computes          
4. Computes                          
In the fourth step,      denotes a hash function, such as SHA-1. The signature 
is the pair      . Verification of the message is as follows; 
1.   and   is verified as           and           
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2. The verifier computes              
3. The verifier computes                 and              
4. The verifier computes                         
The signature is verified, when      .  
 2.2.10. ECDSA 
Another variation of DSA is the Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) [53], which 
works with elliptic curve cryptography instead of integers of modulo prime  . 
To sign a message, the following steps are performed; 
1. User selects a random   with             
2. Compute            , where           .  
3. Compute                      
  is the leftmost bits of     . The signature is the pair      . Verification of the 
message is as follows; 
1.   and   is verified as             and             
2. Compute              
3. Compute              and              
4. Compute                       
  is the leftmost bits of     . The signature is verified, if             . 
2.3. Related Work about Mobile Communication Security 
Before explaining our proposed security framework, we will briefly summarize 
other works about the subject. 
 In [35], authors propose a security protocol to use with mobile payment 
systems over short message service. The proposed protocol provides confidentiality, 
integrity, authentication and non-repudiation of short messages. This model involves 
generating a public/private key pair with a certificate authority and distributing them. 
The private key is stored at the SIM card of the user. The protocol ensures secure 
communication between a customer and a merchant. 
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In [37], authors propose an end-to-end security protocol for short message 
communication over the GSM network. In this protocol, each user has a public and 
private key pair and a certificate verified by an authority. After certificate distribution, 
users exchange their public keys with each other in order to verify the signature of 
short message and decrypt it.  
In [38], authors present a software framework written in Java language, which 
provides an end-to-end security between two users over the short message 
communication. The messages are encrypted and digitally signed in order to provide 
confidentiality and authentication. The secure communication between two users is 
accomplished using public key cryptography. For the key exchange, they minimize 
the number of messages sent between users in order to prevent costs at the operator. 
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3.  THE PROPOSED SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR GSM 
The security vulnerabilities in a GSM network were explained in the previous 
chapters. In this thesis, we have built a security mechanism to ensure secure 
communication between two parties over the GSM network. The main purpose of this 
protocol is to overcome the security vulnerabilities in the network. We first developed 
a peer-to-peer key-exchange protocol, which will be explained in Section 3.1. This 
key exchange protocol is adopted to use for voice communication and for text 
messaging. These applications will be explained in Section 3.2. 
 3.1. Peer-to-peer Key Exchange Protocol for Multiple Sessions 
Our proposed protocol allows secure key exchange and communication between 
two parties, by exchanging their certificates with each other. Those certificates are 
generated by a certificate authority (CA) and both parties have the public key of CA 
to verify the certificate. The certificates are signed using ECDSA algorithm. 
The key exchange is achieved by using Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH). 
After the key exchange is done, a double hash chain is used to derive different 
symmetric keys during communication. In the SMS version of the protocol, every 
message is encrypted using a different key generated from the double hash chain. In 
this way, backward and forward secrecy is achieved. For the voice communication, a 
new key is derived using the hash chain for every new communication session. 
The notations used in the protocol are given in Table 3.1; 
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Table 3.1 – Notations in the protocol 
  Shared secret after ECDH 
   Seed of the first hash chain 
        Phone number of user A 
     Hash value of   
  Message 
  Negotiated length of the hash chain 
    
   symmetric key during communication 
     Symmetric encryption of   
         Expire date for hash chain 
   ECDH Public key of user A 
   ECDH Private key of user A 
    IP address of user A 
   concatenation 
         Signature of message X by user A 
      Certificate of user A 
       ECDSA Public Key 
 
27 
 
In the initialization phase, the computational powers of the mobile devices are 
measured. This is important for deciding the length of the hash chain, because longer 
hash chains require longer time to be calculated on slow processors. Longer 
calculation time means bad user experience during communication. In this phase, our 
protocol calculates how many hash operations the processor can perform for a 
constant time. The result is the number  . During the handshake both parties send 
each other their hash chain length ( ) and the smaller number is selected as the hash 
chain length of the protocol. Along with the number   the user also sends his 
certificate      . This certificate contains the following information; 
- Elliptic Curve Digital Signature (ECDSA) Public Key 
- Phone number of A 
- Expiration date for the certificate 
- Public key of the certification authority (CA) 
- Signature of the CA for the certificate 
The handshake phase is shown in Figure 3.1a. 
 
Figure 3.1a – Handshake message 
 For the case that a user does not want to obtain and exchange certificates, we 
also offer a simplified version of the handshake. In this version the user A sends his 
ECDSA public key to user B with number . When B receives the ECDSA public 
key of user A, B has to confirm that this public key belongs to A. If B denies the 
handshake message, meaning that the ECDSA public key does not belong to A, the 
protocol is canceled. The alternative handshake message is shown in Figure 3.1b. 
28 
 
 
Figure 3.1b – Alternative handshake message 
After the handshake shown in Figure 3.1a, both parties verify other parties’ 
certificate with the public key of CA. Once the certificates are verified, the protocol 
can be initiated. If the users have chosen not to exchange certificates, they have to 
confirm manually that they have exchanged legitimate ECDSA public keys. After 
that, the initiator A sends his ECDH public key   , new session identifier   and the 
chosen expire date         . The user also adds a signature as a proof that the 
message belongs to him. The signature is generated with the following data; 
                                          (3.1) 
 The receiver party B verifies the signature with the certificate of A  
     . If the signature or data is tampered, the protocol is canceled. The key 
exchange phase of the protocol is shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 – Key exchange 
In this step, B calculates the shared secret   using Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman 
explained in Section 2.2.2. After receiving the public key   , B is able to calculate 
the shared secret   as; 
        ,        (3.2) 
where    is the ECDH public key of A and    is the ECDH private key of B. 
After that, B also sends to A his ECDH public key    along with new session 
identifier   and expire date         . The signature for this message is as follows; 
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                                           (3.3) 
After receiving these values, A verifies the signature with the certificate of B. If 
the message is not tampered, A also calculates the secret value   as; 
                (3.4) 
For key generation, a double hash chain is used. In order to build two hash 
chains, we need to generate two different seeds from the shared secret  . The seed 
generation is as follows; 
                             (3.5) 
                              (3.6) 
To calculate a key, the values of both hash chains are XORed. To calculate    
the user needs to calculate          
       . 
The protocol ends when the expiration date is reached or the hash chain is 
totally consumed. In this case, the protocol needs to be restarted in order to build new 
hash chains with new seeds. 
 3.2. Applications of our Key-Exchange Protocol 
The protocol is adopted into two areas of GSM communication. One version is 
used in text messaging, where every message is encrypted using a different key. The 
other version is used in voice communication, where users communicate using AES 
encryption over the data network. 
 3.2.1. Securing SMS Communication 
The main focus of the protocol was to improve the security of the text 
messages. Text messages are the most widely used communication method after voice 
calls [44]. The security of messages is very important due to the information in the 
message content. It is known to us that many companies interact with their clients or 
end users over SMS channel and exchange personal information which cause 
problems if eavesdropped by a third party [1]. Also financial sector and banks send 
personal information or one-time passwords for their on-line operations to their 
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customers via SMS [10]. If the contents of those messages are exposed to an attacker, 
the result can be the loss of valuable information or money for end users. 
Text messages have short data transfer capabilities. The international limit for a 
text message is 160 characters for ASCII alphabet. Which means that          
      bits of data can be sent in each message to the receiver [1]. Therefore, a 
security protocol should consider this important drawback. If a key exchange is 
performed before the communication, more than one message could be sent between 
two parties because of the long key sizes of key exchange algorithms like RSA [40]. 
An application with sending multiple messages is not acceptable for an end user, 
since the mobile operator charges for every message. It is also known that short key 
sizes are no more considered to be secure [19]. Considering these drawbacks, Elliptic 
Curve Diffie Hellman is chosen as the key exchange method in our protocol. It 
provides higher security at lower key sizes [19] and also known to have better 
performance compared to RSA. 
Text message version of the protocol starts with the initialization phase, where 
the performances of both devices are measured. This way the length of the hash chain 
is determined after the handshake as explained in Section 3.1. The lower   value is 
chosen as the hash chain length during the session. Furthermore, users exchange their 
certificates to verify the signatures in the key exchange phase. 
After the handshake, the initiator A sends the following values to B; ECDH 
public key   , expire date for the session          and a new session identifier  . A 
session is defined as the time until expiration date is reached or the number of 
messages has reached the length of the hash chain. In this way, the new session 
identifier specifies the beginning of a new session with fresh variables. Along with 
the message, A also sends a signature containing the phone number (      ) of  , 
session identifier  , public key and expire date. 
                                          (3.7) 
The signature is sent to prove that the message is not tampered and the message 
is from A. An attacker C, who is eavesdropping on the communication between A and 
B, cannot modify the message, since he cannot generate the same signature without 
knowing the private key for ECDSA. After receiving the message, B verifies the 
31 
 
signature with the ECDSA public key of A.  
In this step, B can calculate the secret   as follows; 
                (3.8) 
 In order to calculate the same secret  , A needs the ECDH public key    of B. 
B sends his ECDH public key   ,  the expire date         , which he received from 
A and the new session identifier  . Expire date          and session identifier   are 
send back to A to make sure that both parties have the same values. B also sends the 
signature of his phone number        ,   , expire date          and session 
identifier  . The signature is; 
                                           (3.9) 
After A has received the message, it verifies the signature. A also checks expire 
date          and session identifier   with his own values. If everything matches, A 
does the following calculation; 
                 (3.10) 
  At this step the hash chain can be generated. As said before, we use double 
hash chain of the length   with the following seeds; 
                             (3.11) 
                              (3.12) 
For every message during the session, we use a different key. The key 
generation for each message is done with the help of the double hash chain. To 
calculate the key    for the  
   message in the session, the     value of one hash chain 
is XORed with the value of        value of the other hash chain. 
      
         
             (3.13) 
In order to keep track of the synchronization, the number   should be sent with 
the message. When messages get lost in the SMSC or arrive later than the messages 
sent after, the synchronization between A and B can be lost. To prevent this, we send 
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the sequence number of the message unencrypted attached to the cipher text. If the 
user receives an encrypted message, he will know which key to generate from the 
hash chain. 
 
Figure 3.3 – Encrypted message contents 
The session is over when the number of messages has reached the length of the 
hash chain or the expiration date is reached. In this case, the session needs to be 
restarted to generate a new hash chain with a fresh seeds.  
The advantage of using a new key for every message is to improve the security 
of every message. Let’s say a third person C gets the symmetric key for an arbitrary 
message during a session. Since every message is encrypted with a different key, C 
cannot decrypt other messages even if he has eavesdropped on the entire 
communication. He also cannot generate any other key from the compromised key, 
since the key generation method provides forward and backward secrecy. 
 3.2.2. Securing Voice Communication 
The standard voice communication of the GSM network is encrypted with the 
algorithm A5, which is proven to be insecure [32]. The second implementation of the 
protocol aims to provide extra security for the voice communication. The difference 
from the GSM voice communication is that we use the data network. 3G networks 
provide enough bandwidth to perform a voice call [16].  
In our protocol, both parties will be able to call each other over the data network 
by using their phone numbers. To achieve that, both users exchange their    
addresses with each other in the initialization phase. Otherwise, a third party server is 
used to match    addresses of those two users. The advantage of sharing the    
address over SMS is that both parties will be independent from a third party server. 
The packets are sent encrypted over the data network, and decrypted at the receiver.  
At the initialization phase, both parties calculate their hash length   and send it 
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to each other. Also the certificates are exchanged at this phase. This process is shown 
in Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4 – Voice communication handshake message 
The    address is needed to make the data connection between two devices. 
Since we do not use a third server to store the    addresses with matching phone 
numbers, the    address exchange is crucial. After the handshake, A sends his public 
key   , expire date         , IP address    , new session identifier   and the 
following signature; 
                                                (3.14) 
 After the signature verification, B sends his protocol variables to A. The key 
exchange is show in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5 – Voice communication key exchange 
After B verifies the signature of the message, it calculates the shared secret   as 
follows; 
                (3.15) 
In order to calculate the same secret  , B sends his own ECDH public key    
with expire date         , IP address    , new session identifier   and the signature; 
                                                      (3.16) 
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After A has received the message, it verifies the signature. User A also checks 
expiration date          and session identifier   with his own values. The shared 
secret is calculated by A as; 
                (3.17) 
The shared secret   is used to generate two different seeds for the double hash 
chain. The seeds    and    are generated as; 
                             (3.18) 
                              (3.19) 
 For the first voice communication, the first key is used according to the 
following key generation method; 
      
         
             (3.20) 
The synchronization problem in the text message protocol is solved differently 
in the voice implementation. Here, we send the number   to generate the key     as the 
first data packet over the data network. The receiver party will know which key to 
generate from the hash chain. The voice chat ends after receiving a packet that says 
that the voice chat is over. After that, the program listens to the packet, which will 
start a new chat and generate a new key   . 
                                                (3.21) 
 The session is over when   voice calls are made between user A and user B or 
the expiration date is reached. Another reason to restart the protocol is the change of 
   address. The    address can change because of the data network connection. 
We do not encrypt every packet with a different key during a voice 
communication because of two reasons. First, the number   is too small for the 
number of packets sent during a voice call. Second, it requires a powerful processor to 
generate a different key using the key generation method above for every packet 
during the voice stream. The encryption and decryption of voice packet should be 
done fast in order to have a smooth voice chat.  
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 3.3. Security Analysis 
Here we explain the security analysis of both protocols. The advantages and 
disadvantages will be explained in detail. 
3.3.1. Header Change Attacks on Short Messages 
Since the header is not protected in the text messaging infrastructure of GSM, it 
can be maliciously modified. The sender information of a text message is stored in the 
header. Any person, who can modify the header of a short message, can impersonate a 
phone number. In the protocol, the phone number        is protected by the 
signature. Once the certificate is verified by the public key of CA, both users know 
that the message is signed by the sender.  
3.3.2. Man in the Middle Attack 
The man in the middle attack in Diffie-Hellman key exchange scenarios 
involves a third device listening both parties and also sending messages to them. 
During the key exchange, the attacker receives the public key of A and responds with 
his own public key, while it will also send B his own public key and makes a key 
exchange with both A and B. Since there is no authentication, A and B will think that 
the key exchange is successful and begin their “secure” communication, but every 
message that A sends will be decrypted by the attacker and re-encrypted for B. This 
way, the attacker will listen to the entire communication. 
Since all the variables are signed with a valid signature at the seed exchange 
phase of our protocol, a third party cannot perform a man-in-the-middle attack, 
because it needs to know the ECDSA private key to generate a valid signature. 
 3.3.3. Forward and Backward Secrecy 
If an attacker somehow gets the key for one SMS during the text messaging, it 
will be impossible to calculate any future or past keys from that key. Also in the voice 
communication, when an attacker gets the key for one voice chat, he cannot produce 
other keys used in one session. Since the elements of two chains are XORed to 
calculate the key, the attacker cannot know any values of the hash chains. Even if the 
attacker somehow gets the value of one hash chain, the hash function will be secure 
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enough to protect the seed of the chain from attacker. If an attacker gets a key during 
the session, he cannot calculate the keys before that key, since it is not possible to go 
backward in the hash chain. Therefore, we provide backward secrecy. Also it is 
impossible for an attacker to calculate future keys in the session, since he has to go 
back in at least one hash chain, which is impossible according to the one way property 
of hash functions. Forward secrecy is achieved in this way. 
 3.4. Further  Discussion 
As symmetric cipher, we use AES-128 in counter mode. Because of the bit 
limitation of the text message (            bit for message body), symmetric 
operation modes that require padding of plain text to fix the block sizes are not 
suitable. Padding could result in sending multiple messages, which is not preferred to 
avoid extra charges by the mobile operator. As the hash algorithm, SHA-256 is 
chosen to provide equal security strength. 
The elliptic curve used for Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman is created with the 
parameters           as stated in [23]. This curve is a 256-bit elliptic curve over 
  with the following parameters; 
p = FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
FFFFF 
a = FFFFFFFF00000001000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 
FFFFC 
b = 5AC635D8AA3A93E7B3EBBD55769886BC651D06B0CC53B0F63BCE3C3E 
27D2604B 
The curve is defined as                 over   . The base point  , the 
order   and cofactor   are; 
G = 046B17D1F2E12C4247F8BCE6E563A440F277037D812DEB33A0F4A13945 
D898C2964FE342E2FE1A7F9B8EE7EB4A7C0F9E162BCE33576B315ECECBB64
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06837BF51F5  
n = FFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2F 
C632551 
Message sizes during protocol initialization are optimized as follows; 
1. Handshake messages contain the hash chain length  , which is an 
integer of size    bits. The certificate contains the ECDSA public key with 256 bits, 
public key of certificate authority with 256 bits, signature with 520 bits and expiration 
date with 32 bits. The message size is calculated as                   
     bits, which can fit in a text message. 
2. Key exchange message includes the public key  , the new session 
identifier   and the         . The public key is of size     bits. The expiration date 
         is a timestamp with the size    bits. The signature costs 520 bits. The 
session identifier   is a number with   bits. The message size is calculated as 
                  bits. In the voice communication protocol, the    
address is included in the message, which can be    characters at max. 
38 
 
4. TESTS AND RESULTS 
In this section we will give performance test results for the implementation of 
protocols in Section 3. The performance tests are based on the running time of 
symmetric encryption, digital signature and key agreement. Furthermore, for the voice 
communication the 3G network performance is measured for various places in a city. 
In section 4.1 the development platform for the voice and text communication 
protocol will be explained. In Section 4.2 performance test results for text messaging 
protocol will be given. Voice communication performance results are given in Section 
4.3. 
 4.1. Development Platform 
As development environment Android and J2ME platforms were chosen. J2ME 
is currently the most widely used [44] application platform in mobile phone industry. 
Mainly focused on non-smart phones, J2ME offers to develop powerful applications 
in Java language on devices with limited computing capabilities. Android is an open 
source operating system focused on smart phones. Developed by Google and 
supported by Open Handset Alliance [45], Android has become the most emerging 
platform in the smart phone world. Android is basically a linux system with a Java 
Virtual Machine (dalvik) [45] build on top of it. JVM allows the operating system to 
run rich Java applications, which can use the capabilities of phone’s hardware. Like 
J2ME, Android does not support the standard Java JDK; it owns his own libraries and 
a development kit [45]. 
The iOS platform, which is used in Apple’s mobile products like iPhone and 
iPad [46], is another powerful operating system known by its stability. Unlike 
Android, iOS does not run applications on a virtual machine, which results in better 
performance for Apple devices [46]. Although this platform seems to be a good 
alternative for developing mobile applications, it lacks the flexibility of accessing 
device’s core abilities like receiving and sending SMS messages in background. 
Therefore, our protocol cannot be realized on Apple platforms. 
For the implementation of the protocol, Bouncy Castle cryptography library is 
used. Bouncy Castle library provides a large set of crypto algorithms for developer. 
The elliptic curve Diffie Hellman, Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and 
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AES are both available in the package. It is also supports J2ME and Android (Java) 
platforms [5]. To the best of our knowledge Bouncy Castle is the most popular and 
widely used open source project with support for elliptic curve cryptography. The 
library can be downloaded from its web site (http://www.bouncycastle.org) and the 
appropriate jar files can be easily mounted into any project. Bouncy castle also 
supports C# language, but Windows Mobile platforms are not in the scope of this 
thesis. 
Bouncy Castle is often criticized because of his performance on JVM. Although 
there are other non Java solutions for calculating elliptic curve operations on mobile 
devices with low computational power [52, 54, 55], we choose Java environment 
because of its wide usage. Furthermore, an application written in Java is easy to 
export and distribute among users in platform independent way. 
The Java supported platforms, both J2ME and Android, are very suitable to 
implement SMS applications, since they allow low-level access to text messages. In 
J2ME platform, it is possible to send binary SMS, which makes it possible to send 
encrypted data array without converting to base64 format. Android also supports 
binary SMS. Furthermore, with Android it is possible to access mobile phones SMS 
storage and to listen to SMS traffic in background. With the background process in 
Android operating system, the user does not have to run the application as the main 
process. The encrypted messages are decrypted on the background when they arrive 
and then stored in the database. The default pre-installed messaging application of the 
phone cannot read encrypted messages; they can only be read from the application. 
Android provides rich streaming libraries for voice and video streaming. 
Besides streaming, the developer can also implement networking applications, which 
support the network communication libraries of Java language. Our secure voice 
communication application sends encrypted packets over the UDP protocol.  
 4.2. Performance Tests for Message Communication 
For the message communication, the following measurements are done; 
1. ECDH Key Agreement calculation time 
2. ECDSA signature verification and generation time 
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3. Hash chain generation time 
4. AES encryption performance 
 4.2.1. Devices Used in Message Communication Tests 
For performance tests, we used different mobile phones from various vendors.  
The CPU metrics are taken from jBenchmark, a famous site known for performing 
tests on every mobile device on the market [4]. The CPU comparison for our test 
phones can be seen in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 – Processors of different mobile phone hardware 
 SE K750i SE W580i SE K550i HTC Touch HD 
Processor 
Speed [4] 
ARM9 110 
MHz 
ARM9 187 
MHz 
ARM9 
201MHz 
Qualcomm® MSM 
7201A™ 528 MHz 
 
 The Sony Ericsson series K and W both support J2ME platform. The HTC 
Touch series run Windows Mobile as operating system. The J2ME support in this 
device is not native, which means the program runs with the help of a Java Virtual 
Machine.  
 4.2.2. Algorithm Performance Tests 
In this section, we give performance results for symmetric encryption 
algorithms, ECDSA signature generation and ECDH key agreement. The key 
agreement phase for our protocol with 256-bit key size can be seen in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 – ECDH Performance Results (seconds) 
 SE K750i SE W580i SE K550i 
HTC Touch 
HD 
Processor 
Speed [4] 
ARM9 110 
MHz 
ARM9 187 
MHz 
ARM9 
201MHz 
Qualcomm® 
MSM 7201A™ 
528 MHz 
ECDH Key 
Agreement 
(512 bits) 
158,75 44,85 31,61 18,45 
ECDH Key 
Agreement 
(384 bits) 
152,80 27,38 19,30 8,033 
ECDH Key 
Agreement 
(256 bits) 
92,25 14,25 10,26 5,67 
 
The calculation of the shared secret with 256-bit key size takes 152 seconds on 
the slowest hardware with 110 MHz CPU power. Smart phones with more powerful 
CPUs can run the same calculation with 256-bit key size in 8 seconds. Therefore, 
during the protocol, the application will require most of the time for the key 
agreement before the encrypted communication can start. For faster devices with 
500+ MHz CPU, the key agreement will have less effect on the user experience. 
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Table 4.3 – ECDSA Performance Results (seconds) 
 SE K750i SE W580i SE K550i 
HTC Touch 
HD 
Processor 
Speed [4] 
ARM9 110 
MHz 
ARM9 187 
MHz 
ARM9 
201MHz 
Qualcomm® 
MSM 7201A™ 
528 MHz 
ECDSA Sign 
(512 bits) 
205,45 59,52 43,19 24,92 
ECDSA Verify 
(512 bits) 
251,14 73,41 54,35 31,24 
ECDSA Sign 
(384 bits) 
165,74 30,01 19,73 8,34 
ECDSA Verify 
(384 bits) 
195,45 35,72 24,30 10,12 
ECDSA Sign 
(256 bits) 
67,85 10,12 7,21 3,62 
ECDSA Verify 
(256 bits) 
79,84 11,95 8,69 4,32 
 
The signature generation takes 205 seconds on the slowest device with 512 bit 
key size. For the key size of 256 bits, which is used for the protocol, the key 
generation takes between 68 seconds and 7 seconds. For faster devices with 500+ 
MHz CPU, the signature generation will be calculated in less than 4 seconds. 
Verification of the signature takes a little longer. On the slowest devices, ECDSA 
signature verification takes 251 seconds, where the fastest device calculates in less 
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than 32 seconds for 512 bits key size. 
Table 4.4 – Length of Hash Chains generated in one second 
 
SE K750i SE W580i SE K550i 
HTC Touch 
HD 
Processor 
Speed [4] 
ARM9 110 
MHz 
ARM9 187 
MHz 
ARM9 
201MHz 
Qualcomm® 
MSM 7201A™ 
528 MHz 
SHA 256 
(length of 
chain) 
1045 5507 5769 10598 
SHA 512 
(length of 
chain) 
482 1088 1113 3346 
 
For the hash chain generation performance, we measured how long the hash 
chain will be for every device after one second. As an input   for the hash chain, the 
string “testdata” is given. The results can be seen in Table 4.3. When SHA512 is used 
as hash algorithm, the chain length for SE K750i measured as    . For SHA256, we 
get a hash chain with length      after one second. For the fastest processor, we get a 
hash chain of length       for SHA256 and a hash chain of length      for 
SHA512.  
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Table 4.5 – AES encryption performance 
 
SE K750i SE W580i SE K550i 
HTC Touch 
HD 
AES 128 
(milliseconds) 
1,20 0,24 0,23 0,10 
AES 256 
(milliseconds) 
1,51 0,30 0,29 0,12 
 
AES performance is measured as the time elapsed for encrypting the string 
“deneme12deneme12”. The performance of AES128 on slowest processor is 
measured as 1,20 milliseconds. The fastest CPU can encrypt the string in 0,10 
milliseconds. Therefore, we can say that symmetric encryption causes almost no delay 
on the protocol. 
  4.3. Performance Tests for Voice Communication 
For the voice communication, the following measurements are done; 
1. AES Encryption performance 
2. Average end to end delay for EDGE and 3G network 
3. 3G network performance 
 4.3.1. Devices Used in Voice Communication Tests 
For the voice implementation, we targeted smart phones, since they offer more 
CPU power. Two devices were chosen, Samsung i7500 and Google Nexus. The 
performance metrics for these phones can be seen in Table 4.5. 
45 
 
Table 4.6 – Device Comparison Table 
 Samsung i7500 Google Nexus 
Processor 
Qualcomm MSM7200A 
528 Mhz 
1 GHz Qualcomm QSD 8250 
Snapdragon ARM 
Memory 192 MB 512 MB DRAM 
OS Android 1.5 Android 2.2 
 
The Samsung i7500 is one of the first Android devices on the market and the 
Google Nexus is the first official phone from Google himself. Both devices are 
powerful smart phones with high computational power and Android operating system. 
The implementation is written using Android 1.5 SDK. Since Android is a backward 
compatible operating system, applications written in older SDKs can also run in 
future versions. Therefore, for Google Nexus we used the same implementation. 
 4.3.2. Encryption Test Results 
Since the packet sizes and CPU powers are different than text messaging 
implementation, we also performed encryption tests for voice implementation. 
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Table 4.7 – Average Encryption / Decryption Times  
 Samsung i7500 Google Nexus 
Processor 
Qualcomm MSM7200A 
528 MHz 
1 GHz Qualcomm QSD 8250 
Snapdragon ARM 
AES Encryption 
(milliseconds)  
32 5 
AES Decryption 
(milliseconds) 
37 7 
 
The decryption time is the time after the device receives the packet as an 
encrypted byte array and decrypts it. The encryption time is the time when the sound 
is turned into byte array and gets encrypted before sending to the receiver. As can be 
seen from Table 4.6, the powerful the hardware, the shorter it takes to encrypt and 
decrypt the packets. The packet size for the encryption is bigger than the packets used 
in message encryption. The packet size is       bits. 
 The overhead of the symmetric encryption on the protocol is negligible, since 
the encryption and decryption delay has no effects on user experience during 
communication.  
 4.3.3. Network Performance 
The network performance is important for the conversation quality during a 
voice communication. More delay means bad user experience during a conversation, 
therefore we also measured the average delay for GSM and 3G networks. 
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Table 4.8 – Average End to End Delay 
 Average Delay 
EDGE 32 s 
3G 9 s 
  
The advantage of 3G networks can be seen from the results in Table 4.7. The 
average end to end delay is significantly higher than standard data networks. But 9 
seconds average in 3G network is still not enough to perform a conversation, since the 
delay is too high. Since the performance of the network dependent to population and 
network coverage, we will also examine the impact of location in the next experiment.  
Table 4.9 – Average Delay in Different Location over the 3G Network 
 Location 1 Location 2 Location 3 Location 4 
Average 
Delay 
34 s 3,6 s 5,0 s 4 s 
Standard 
Deviation 
25,4 s 3,3 s 3,9 s 3,2 s 
Latitude 40.792406 40.982338 41.021791 41.0707635 
Longitude 29.467952 29.105075 29.041483 29.061937 
Province Gebze / 
Kocaeli 
Kozyatağı / 
Kadıköy 
Altunizade / 
Üsküdar 
Kandilli / 
Üsküdar 
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From the results of location comparison in Table 4.8, we can see that the 3G 
network performance is highly affected from the location. The main reasons for 
differences of the performance are the distance from the base station, the population 
in the area and the network coverage. Also at some places different 3G standards are 
available, like dual channels, HSDPA or HSPA, which result in different download 
and upload speeds. 
In all locations, there is a variable delay. The standard deviation for the first 
location is calculated as 25.4 seconds, which means that the delay changes between 9 
seconds and 59 seconds. For other locations, where there is an average delay between 
3.6 to 5 seconds, the standard deviation is also high. That means the mobile network 
cannot guarantee an equal delay for every data packet. 
Location 4 in Table 4.8 is an urban area with low population, which has a 
positive effect on the data performance. Location 3 is more crowded, which results in 
more delay. Location 2 is also a populated urban area, but number of base stations and 
network coverage is higher than Location 3. Although Location 1 has less population 
than other locations, the number of base stations and network coverage is low, 
because it is a rural area. Therefore, Location 1 has the highest delay. 
The results show that voice communication can be done over the data network. 
With the old generation data network, the sound quality should be as low as possible, 
but still the average end to end delay shows that there will be long delays during 
communication. 3G networks allow faster data communication. However the 
performance of the network depends on coverage, population around the base station 
and location. There can be significant differences in the network performance, which 
affect the sound quality badly. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The security vulnerabilities in current GSM networks allow eavesdroppers to 
monitor entire communication between the mobile device and the base station over 
the air. Over the air communication is encrypted using the A5 cipher. However, A5 
algorithm is a weak one and has already been broken [20]. Furthermore, SS7, the 
communication protocol between the base station and operator, has no encryption.  
In this thesis, we designed and implemented a multipurpose security platform 
for mobile communication over GSM / 3G. First, we developed an authenticated key 
exchange protocol using Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and Elliptic 
Curve Diffie Hellman algorithm. After the key exchange, keys for symmetric 
encryption are generated with a method using double hash chains. Double hash chain 
provides forward and backward secrecy for messages during communication. In this 
way, if any key during the communication is compromised, earlier or future keys 
cannot be generated from the compromised key. 
The key exchange protocol is applied to short message communication, which is 
the most popular service in a GSM network after voice communication. According to 
GSM standards, short messages are not end-to-end encrypted, such as header 
modification and eavesdropping.  In our protocol, two users run ECDH for agreeing 
on a secret key. After the key exchange, a different symmetric key for each message 
is generated. The key generation method provides forward and backward secrecy. 
The key exchange protocol is also applied to voice communication. In our 
protocol, encrypted voice communication is done over the data network. Therefore, 
users need to share their IP addresses before the key exchange. During the 
initialization before the key exchange, IP addresses are sent to each other. The key 
exchange is done over the short message protocol. After the handshake, the voice 
communication is performed over the data network. Like the short message protocol, 
the symmetric keys for each session are generated using a double hash chain. If the 
symmetric key of a session is compromised, earlier or future keys cannot be generated 
from the compromised key. 
In this thesis, we also implemented our protocols for voice and message 
communications. For the development, we used open-source Android platform 
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developed by Google. For ECDH, ECDSA and AES implementations, we used an 
open-source library called Bouncy Castle, which provides implementations of many 
popular encryption algorithms in Java. 
Although mobile devices are known for their lack of computational power, 
performance tests show that AES symmetric encryption with 128-bit key sizes for a 
16 characters long string can be done in less than 1 millisecond. ECDH key 
agreement with 512-bit key size can be calculated on the slowest CPU with 110 MHz 
around 158 seconds. Faster machines, for example smart phones with 500+ MHz 
CPU, require less than 10 seconds. 
For the voice communication protocol, we also measured the data network 
performance for various places in the city. First, the network type (GSM and 3G) 
performance is measured. GSM networks show slow performance on data 
communication, even if EDGE is used as the connection type. On the other hand, 3G 
networks offer more bandwidth and less delay. Despite the bandwidth they offer, 3G 
network performance is highly affected by population and topography. Our tests show 
an average delay between 3 seconds to 34, which is highly unstable. 
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APPENDIX  
In this appendix, instruction to the implementations will be given. In the 
first section, the short message implementation will be explained. In the second 
section, the voice implementation will be given in more detail. 
 A1. SMS 
The following is the user’s manual for the Android version of the SMS 
encryption application. The application is developed using Android 1.5 SDK.  
 
Figure A.1 – Main Screen 
In the main screen, which is the first screen to appear when the application 
starts, the user has the following options as in Figure A.1; 
1. Address Book: where the user can add / remove friends 
2. Send SMS: where the user can send encrypted SMS to his contacts 
3. Inbox: where encrypted SMSs from others are stored unencrypted 
4. Outbox: messages the user has sent 
5. Settings: protocol specific settings 
57 
 
 
Figure A.2 – Address Book 
In the address book, the user can see contacts he has created. Here, we have two 
contacts, Test 5556 and Test 5554 in Figure A.2. In order to create a new contact, the 
user presses the Menu button of his Android device and selects “Add new contact” 
from the menu. The user cannot send encrypted messages to a person, unless that 
person is in the contact list. 
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Figure A.3 – Add new user 
In the “Add new user” screen, the user can create a new contact. The screen can 
be seen in Figure A.3. User email is reserved for future development. Currently it is 
not necessary. In order to send a new message or start the protocol, the user has to be 
recorded in the database. 
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Figure A.4 – Send SMS Screen 
Once the user has created his contacts, he can choose the name of the contact to 
send an encrypted SMS. If the user wishes to start a new protocol or restart an 
existing one, he presses either the “H1 Start” or “H2 Start” button for the choice of 
handshake as explained in Section 3. The protocol will send two messages to the 
selected contact; one for the protocol initialization and one for the ECDH key 
exchange. After a successful key exchange; the user will receive a notification that the 
protocol is set and ready. Now the user can write his message in the textbox and click 
“Send”. This screen can be seen in Figure A.4. 
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Figure A.5 – Inbox 
In the inbox, the user can see his received messages. If the user uses the inbox 
of the default SMS application bundled in the Android operating system, he will not 
be able to read his messages, since they are encrypted. Encrypted messages can only 
be read from the application. The inbox screen can be seen in Figure A.5. When a 
message from the list is selected, the window in Figure A.6 will appear: 
61 
 
 
Figure A.6 – Read SMS Screen 
The decrypted content of a message can be read in this screen. Here, the user 
can see sender info, the time the message was received and the contents of the 
message in plain text. “Delete” button removes the message from the inbox and 
“Reply” button opens the compose screen, where the user can send an answer to the 
sender. A simple message is shown in Figure A.6. 
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Figure A.7 – Outbox 
The outbox button in Figure A.7 has the same design like the inbox. Here, the 
user can see the messages he has sent. When the user wants to read a message, a 
similar window like Figure A.6 will appear where he can see the contents of the 
message. 
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Figure A.8 – Settings Screen 
In the settings screen shown in Figure A.8, the user can set following properties 
that will affect the protocol; 
1. The security level 
2. Expire date for the protocol 
3. User info 
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Figure A.9 – Security Level Screen 
The security level affects the length of the hash chain with respect to device’s 
hardware. Higher security means more frequent restarts in protocol, which will result 
in sending more messages. 
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Figure A.10 – Expire Date Settings 
In the “Expire Date” screen shown in Figure A.10, the user can set the 
expiration date for the protocol.  Shorter values require more restarts for the protocol, 
which causes sending more messages. 
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Figure A.11 – User Info Settings 
In the “User Info” screen shown in Figure A.11, the user can set his personal 
information. The phone number is vital, since it cannot be read from SIM card and 
required by the protocol. The phone number is used in the hash of the key exchange 
message during protocol initialization. 
 A2. Voice 
The voice encryption implementation is also written in Android platform using 
version 1.5. When the application starts, the screen in Figure A.12 will appear; 
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Figure A.12 – Main Screen 
In the main menu shown in Figure A.12, the user will have three choices; 
1. Address Book: here the user can add / remove contacts 
2. Make Call: the user can start communication with his stored contacts 
3. Settings: the user can set program specific settings 
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Figure A.13 – Address Book 
In the address book the user can see contacts he has created. Here we have two 
contacts, Test 5556 and Test 5554 as shown in Figure A.13. In order to create a new 
contact, the user presses the Menu button of your Android device and select “Add 
new contact” from the menu. The screen will appear in Figure A.14; 
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Figure A.14 – Add new user 
The user can enter the properties for his new contact in the “Add New User” 
screen shown in Figure A.14. The user cannot send an encrypted message, unless the 
contact is in his address book.  
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Figure A.15 – Make Call Screen 
To start a call, the user should select the contact he wishes to communicate from 
the list. By pressing the “Start Protocol” button, the user initiates a new key exchange 
or restarts an existing session. After the protocol is done, he can start his encrypted 
communication by pressing the “Call” button. If the user wishes to see the current IP 
address, clicking the “Renew Address” button shows the current IP. To drop a call, 
the user presses the “Stop” button. The screen is shown in Figure A.15. 
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Figure A.16 – Settings Screen 
In the settings screen shown in Figure A.16, the user can set following 
properties that will affect the protocol; 
1. The security level 
2. Expire date for the protocol 
3. User info 
72 
 
 
Figure A.17 – Security Level Screen 
The security level affects the length of the hash chain with respect to devices 
hardware. This is a simpler way for the user to modify the variables in the protocol, 
like expire date and hash chain length. 
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Figure A.18 – Expire Date Settings 
In the screen shown in Figure A.18, the user can set the expiration date for the 
protocol.  Shorter values require more restarts for the protocol, which causes sending 
more messages. 
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Figure A.19 – User Info Settings 
In the screen shown in Figure A.19, the user sets his personal information. The 
phone number is vital since it cannot be read from SIM card and required by the 
protocol. 
 
 
